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e concluye en el artículo *Internal Control and the Insider versus Outsider CEO Choice*, escrito por Baer, Leah M., Khurana, Inder K., Kyung, Hoyoun, publicado por *Journal of Management Accounting Research*, 10492127, 2023, Vol. 35, Fascículo 2, lo siguiente: “*In this paper, we empirically examine how the internal control environment influences the board's selection of an insider versus outsider CEO. We examine two competing views. The insider view takes a firm's internal environment as fixed and posits that in a weak reporting environment, boards are more likely to recruit an insider CEO, with whom they are familiar because such an environment allows CEOs to manipulate performance ([34]). Under this view, control weaknesses make it difficult for boards to detect and replace poorly performing outsider CEOs, thereby diminishing the real option value of hiring an outsider CEO. Under the outsider view, boards will recruit outsiders because they believe that insiders contributed to the weak reporting environment and that an outsider CEO is more likely to improve firm reporting environment ([ 7]; [14]; [15]; [55]). ―Consistent with the notion that a firm's information environment is a key consideration in the board's decision of choosing an insider or outsider CEO, we find that internal control weaknesses have a bearing on the insider versus outsider decision. Specifically, we find that the board prefers an outsider CEO in the presence of a weak internal control environment, supporting the outsider view. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the adverse effect of weak internal controls on the likelihood of hiring an insider CEO is attenuated for firms that restate past financial statements and is stronger when boards are more independent. In additional analysis, we find evidence that audit fees are lower when an outsider CEO is appointed in the presence of an internal control material weakness, consistent with outsider CEOs being perceived as less risky by auditors. Overall, we find evidence that boards of directors prefer outsider CEOs in the presence of weak internal controls, presumably because outsider CEOs work toward improving the quality of the information environment.*” Con gran claridad COSO ha afirmado que el ambiente de control es un reflejo de las actitudes de la alta gerencia. Si esta siempre busca el mejor control posible, la organización buscará lo mismo. Por lo tanto, tiene sentido que las debilidades del control sean achacadas a los jefes. No creemos que sea posible que los jefes supervisen directamente todo detalle, como se ha sostenido en algunas providencias por parte de entidades de supervisión, capaces de teorizar al punto de exigir acciones angelicales. Pero si pueden y deben hacerlo con sus subalternos directos. En esta materia tiene mucha importancia definir correctamente el tramo de control, es decir, hasta dónde “alcanza el brazo” del ejecutivo. Este no es un concepto absoluto. En ciertas condiciones se pueden supervisar 3 personas y en otras 15. Por lo tanto, hay que hacer un análisis y tomar una decisión en concreto. Las juntas directivas deben establecer procedimientos concretos para ejercer la supervisión que les incumbe. Se les puede engañar fácilmente si son ingenuas.

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